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Abstract
Scientific realism driven by inference to the best explanation (IBE) takes
empirically confirmed objects to exist, independent,pace empiricism, of
whether those objects are observable or not. This kind of realism, it has
been claimed, does not need probabilistic reasoning to justify the claim
that these objects exist. But I show that there are scientific contexts in
which a non-probabilistic IBE-driven realism leads to a puzzle. Since IBE
can be applied in scientific contexts in which empirical confirmation has
not yet been reached, realists will in these contexts be committed to the
existence of empirically unconfirmed objects. As a consequence of such
commitments, because they lack probabilistic features, the possible empir-
ical confirmation of those objects is epistemically redundant with respect
to realism.
Keywords: Scientific Realism, Theory Confirmation, Dark Matter, Non-Empirical
Theory Confirmation, Inference to the Best Explanation
1 Introduction
The explanationist version of scientific realism typically invokes inference to the
best explanation (IBE) to justify realism regarding unobservable objects that
are indispensable for the novel predictive success of a theory. The existence of
those indispensable unobservables is the best explanation for the theory’s pre-
dictive success. The idea is to safeguard the connection between explanation and
truth from the anti-realist meta-inductive argument, according to which, many
predictively successful theories have turned out to be false – which provides rea-
son to doubt the truth of currently held predictively successful theories. This
IBE-driven realism has typically been applied to contexts in which the unob-
servable objects of dispute enjoy some degree of empirical confirmation. Based
on this confirmation, the realist argues that we should believe in the existence
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of these objects because they constitute the best explanation of the predictive
success, while the anti-realist claims that we should not.
There is no reason internal to the realist programme as to why the mechanics
of IBE should be restricted to the domain of empirically confirmed objects.
IBE can just as easily be applied to predictively successful theories the central
objects of which have not been empirically confirmed. As a case study, I use
the theory of dark matter. The theory of dark matter ticks all the realist boxes:
it’s sufficiently mature, it’s predictively successful, it has explanatory breadth
and depth, and it satisfies the theoretical virtues of IBE. Consequently, the
realist is forced to commit to the existence of dark matter despite the fact that
dark matter has not been empirically confirmed. This shows that the epistemic
commitments of IBE-driven realism reach beyond the boundary of empirical
confirmation.
This consequence might on its own merit caution, given the constitutive
theses of scientific realism. But the far more serious implication of this fact is
that the possible empirical confirmation of dark matter in the future would have
no epistemic effect on the realist commitment. This is a direct consequence of the
non-probabilistic nature of IBE used by some realists. Since this version of IBE
does not offer any way to grade belief, it is forced to output the (approximate)
truth of the theory of dark matter, as opposed to an increase in its probability of
being true, in response to dark matter’s explanatory virtues. So, what epistemic
difference does it make to realism if we empirically confirm dark matter? I argue
that these considerations provide good reasons for realists to look at probabilistic
versions of explanatory reasoning, an end to which I offer a tentative suggestion
in the form of meta-empirical confirmation.
2 The epistemology of scientific realism
Psillos (1999, 2009) defines one of the three central theses of scientific realism
in the following way:
The Epistemic Thesis: Mature and predictively successful scientific
theories are well confirmed and approximately true of the world. So,
the entities posited by them, or, at any rate, entities very similar to
those posited, inhabit the world. (Psillos 2009, 4)
The epistemic reach of science goes beyond the observable world such that
knowledge about unobservables is not just possible, but actual. The version
of realism that aims to provide a rationale for this claim, and the one I will
focus on in this paper, has been articulated and defended by Psillos (1999, 2000,
2007, 2009).1 Psillos’s realism narrows the scope of theoretical truth that can be
reached by using indispensability and predictive success. We ought to be realists
only about the parts of a theory (and the entities posited therein) that are
indispensable for the predictive success of the theory. This manoeuvre localizes
1See also Kitcher (1995).
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the retained parts of previous theories that were empirically successful but false
(thus mitigating the force of Laudan’s (1981) pessimistic meta-induction), and
it attempts to connect unobservables to empirical data via indispensability.
The inference that licenses us to go from ‘x is indispensable for the predictive
success of h’ to ‘x is real’ is IBE: the best explanation for the fact that (the
positing of) an object is indispensable for the predictive success of a theory
is that it really exists. It is easy to see, then, that IBE is a key element in
this realist position.2 Given that it is an ampliative inference, the legitimacy
of reasoning in accordance with IBE has been heavily criticized (van Fraassen
1989, Fine 1991); it has also been vigorously defended (Douven 2002, Bird
2006, Lipton 2003, Psillos 2007, 2009). Psillos takes IBE to be an inference that
operates with ‘epistemic standards’ or explanatory virtues to rank hypotheses
on the basis of which we are warranted in making our inferences. If a hypothesis
H is ranked to be the best explanation among its competitors with respect to
the relevant background knowledge, we should infer that it is (approximately)
true. He even suggests that it is the inference that best captures the abstract
concept of the scientific method:
IBE can emerge as the general specification of scientific method
which promises to solve in the best way its central philosophical
problem. (Psillos 2009, 194)
Psillos’s characterization of IBE as the scientific method is a result of comparing
it to hypothetico-deductivism and enumerative induction as a way to balance
epistemic warrant with epistemic risk. For the purposes of this paper, it makes
more sense to take a closer look at Psillos’s view of the relationship between
IBE and Bayesianism.
2.1 IBE and Bayesianism
In confirmation theory, most philosophers agree that some form of Bayesianism
is our best option. While many have suggested that Bayesianism and IBE can
be combined or used together in a number of interesting ways, Psillos has argued
against this:3
Bayesian reasoning does not have rules of acceptance. On a strict
Bayesian approach, we can never detach the probability of the con-
clusion of a probabilistic argument, no matter how high this proba-
bility might be. So, strictly speaking, we are never licensed to accept
a hypothesis on the basis of the evidence. (Psillos 2009, 195)
2Rowbottom (2019b) identifies and explicates the presumed relation between ampliative
reasoning and scientific progress as a methodological thesis of scientific realism. See Row-
bottom (2019a) for a critical argument against scientific realism due to the failure of the
methodological thesis.
3See Lipton (2003) Niiniluoto (2004), Henderson (2013) and Weisberg (2009) for different
versions of compatibilist approaches to IBE and Bayesianism.
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One can clearly see how there is a tension between the project of providing
epistemic criteria for accepting a theory as being true via IBE and the “naked”
probabilistic conclusions given by Bayesianism. Psillos (2004, 2007, 2009) con-
siders a number of ways to combine IBE and Bayesianism but ultimately argues
against it. According to him, the most plausible way of combining them – letting
explanatory considerations guide prior probabilities – suffers from two problems.
If we incorporate explanatory considerations in subjective Bayesianism, it trivi-
alizes the epistemic role played by explanation because priors wash out anyway.
The upshot of subjective Bayesianism is that almost any method for deter-
mining priors works because continually updating on evidence makes posteriors
converge over time. If we let explanatory power be a normative constraint on
priors, thereby switching to an objective Bayesianism, it calls for a radical con-
ceptual modification of Bayesianism that few would accept. For subjectivism is
the received view on confirmation in Bayesianism, and objectivists have their
own normative rational constraints with which to begin. This ‘dilemma’, Psillos
argues, is best handled by rejecting compatibilism all together. In earlier work,
however, Psillos considers the merits of the Bayesian feature of degrees of belief::
[A]lthough a hypothesis might be reasonably accepted as the most
plausible hypothesis based on explanatory considerations (abduc-
tion), the degree of confidence in this hypothesis is tied to its degree
of subsequent confirmation. (Psillos 2000, 67)
Psillos abandons compatibilism in virtue of the fact that it forces IBE to work in
the context of discovery rather than in the context of justification. Best expla-
nations are only tentative prior to a Bayesian treatment and do not confer any
warrant. In this sense, IBE does not contribute epistemically to the justification
of the hypothesis, which is precisely the opposite of what Psillos argues that IBE
is supposed to do. Psillos’s approach to IBE then, is entirely decoupled from
Bayesianism.
In summary, the kind of scientific realism under consideration here uses
a non-probabilistic version of IBE that operates with explanatory virtues to
generate (approximately) true theories.
2.2 IBE and empirical confirmation
Scientific realists take empirical confirmation of some kind to be a prerequisite
of realist commitment. It is no different in Psillos’s (and Kitcher’s) case:
Kitcher and I draw the line between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ parts of
successful theories differently, but we both agree that confirmation is
selective and that the theoretical constituents that are confirmed are
those that essentially contributed to the success of a theory. (Psillos
2009, 96-7)
Selective confirmation is supposed to stand in contrast to the Quinean idea of
confirmational holism, broadly construed. That is, if a theory is empirically
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tested and its (novel) predictions are correct, the parts of the theory that are
indispensable for those predictions are confirmed, as opposed to the whole the-
ory. Based on this confirmation, we can use those parts, together with any
competing explanations, in IBE which ranks them according to explanatory
virtues and returns a truth-statement. In this way, IBE-driven realism makes
itself dependent on the first-order evidence provided by science that constitutes
empirical confirmation. It’s only after the scientists announce a discovery of
some object, say a particle, that the realist applies IBE and epistemically com-
mits to the existence of that particle. This is particularly telling considering
the realism/anti-realism debate: the disagreement is usually centred around the
observable/unobservable distinction with respect to objects in science that have
been empirically detected.
IBE-driven realism about unobservables is, however, not necessarily con-
nected to the empirical confirmation of those objects. As I show in the follow-
ing section, the selective confirmation championed by Psillos and Kitcher can
sometimes lead to realism about empirically unconfirmed objects.
3 Dark matter
Roughly, one may view the dark matter hypothesis as a theoretical paradigm
invested in the idea that there is a kind of non-baryonic matter that inter-
acts gravitationally but not electromagnetically.4 The term ‘dark matter’ is
commonly attributed to the Swiss astronomer Fritz Zwicky’s speculative ex-
planation of the discrepancy between the observed velocity dispersion and the
calculated gravitational potential of the luminous mass in the Coma Cluster.
The extra gravitational potential, he thought, must be due to some unseen ‘dun-
kle materie’. At the time, he didn’t constrain his speculation to non-baryonic
matter, but the general idea that additional low-luminous matter could explain
the observed dynamical behavior as well as the coining of the phrase was enough
to retrospectively treat Zwicky’s work as the start of the modern history of dark
matter. Although several hypotheses were entertained as explanations of the
observed discrepancy in the mid 20th century, in the 1970’s the dark matter
hypothesis emerged as the most plausible candidate to explain the observed
mass-to-light discrepancy in galaxy clusters. (de Swart et al. 2017) Part of the
scientific community’s growing acceptance of the dark matter hypothesis in the
1970’s was due to the fact that it could explain galaxy cluster dynamics, but
more importantly that it explained the more recent observation that galaxies
had flat rotation curves as measured by Rubin and Ford Jr (1970) among oth-
ers.5 The rotation curve of a galaxy is roughly the plotted orbital speed of stars
4I’m not considering here the recent proposal by Bird et al. (2016) that dark matter could
consist of primordial black holes.
5The synthesis of taking these two different phenomena to be the cause of additional mass
was first made by Ostriker et al. (1974) and Einasto et al. (1974). See de Swart et al. (2017)
and de Swart (2020) for an in depth analysis of the role that the development of modern
cosmology had in this process.
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and gas as a function of their distance from the galactic center. In smaller sys-
tems, such as our solar system, the orbital speed declines with distance so that
planets close to the sun orbit faster than planets further away. When analyzing
the rotation curve of the Andromeda galaxy Rubin and Ford obtained a ’flat’ ro-
tation curve; meaning that the orbital speed of the stars and gas in Andromeda
did not decline with increasing distance from the galaxy center. Flat rotation
curves are taken to be evidence for the presence of additional non-luminous
mass in the form of halos surrounding such galaxies.
Since the 1970’s, a range of phenomena have been discovered that is taken
to support the dark matter hypothesis: gravitational lensing, the decoupling
of mass and gravitational potential in the Bullet Cluster, the formation of the
large scale structure of the universe, et.c.6 The dark matter hypothesis has
displayed remarkable explanatory breadth and depth with respect to a range
of different phenomena and enjoyed predictive success by being indispensable
for the ΛCDM model’s prediction of the large scale distribution of mass (as
confirmed by the Sloan Digital Sky Survey). It also performs well with respect
to the epistemic standards, or explanatory virtues, set up by Psillos (1999).
Consider two of them:
Consilience: Suppose there are two potentially explanatory hypothe-
ses H1 and H2 but the relevant background knowledge favours H1
over H2. Unless there are specific reasons to challenge the back-
ground knowledge, H1 should be accepted as the best explanation.
Unification: Suppose we have two composite explanatory hypotheses
Hk and Hj a body of data e1, ..., en. Suppose that for every piece of
data ei (i = 1, . . . , n) to be explained Hj introduces an explanatory
assumption Hij such that H
i
j explains ei. Hk, on the other hand,
subsumes the explanation of all data under a few hypotheses, and
hence it unifies the explananda. Then Hk is a better explanation
than Hj . (Psillos 2009, 184)
If we take the relevant background knowledge to be general relativity, then
dark matter is the best explanation that connects the background theory to
the evidence, thereby satisfying Consilience. With respect to Unification, dark
matter has subsumed a substantial amount of data under a single postulate,
compared to the rival explanations.7 The dark matter hypothesis displays all
the salient explanatory and predictive features that realists are looking for,
which means that it merits realist commitment. The problem, of course, is that
dark matter is paradigmatically unconfirmed:
Not only has dark matter never been observed in accelerators, it
has also not been seen in direct detection experiments (in which
6See Bertone and Hooper (2018) for an excellent review of the conceptual and evidential
history of dark matter.
7The only rival to dark matter that is currently somewhat seriously considered in cosmology
and astronomy is Modified Newtonian Gravity, or MOND for short.
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the recoil energy of a nucleus impacted by a dark matter particle is
observed) or in indirect detection experiments (in which the debris
from dark matter annihilations in space are observed). (Dodelson
2011, 2)
Hence, IBE-driven realism implies realism about dark matter – a postulated
entity that has yet to be empirically confirmed. Whether this consequence is
taken to be problematic depends on the attitude one takes towards keeping
realism empirically grounded. Realists may claim that their selective confir-
mation strategy in the dark matter case works precisely as intended – dark
matter is an indispensable part of the predictive success of the ΛCDM model,
and is therefore, as it should be, confirmed in virtue of this fact. Others might
find the confirmation-by-indispensability strategy to be disconnected from a
proper theory of confirmation. No respectable scientist would agree that the
existence of dark matter is confirmed in the strong sense that follows from the
non-probabilistic nature of IBE endorsed by realists.
Bear in mind that I am not implying that philosophy of science should al-
ways appeal to scientific authority with respect to confirmation theory, but the
discrepancy between empirical confirmation by observation or detection and
confirmation by indispensability conflates having theoretical and explanatory
reasons for believing that dark matter exists with confirming that it exists by
detecting it. This is precisely why the dark matter case is interesting to analyze
from a realist perspective. The central objects of a theory are usually empirically
confirmed before the philosophical discussion of their existence kicks, but in the
case of dark matter it is not, which exposes a vulnerability in the realist project.
In fact, taking the selective confirmation by indispensability approach is even
more vulnerable because, as it turns out, it is inconsistent with empirical con-
firmation by detection within a realist framework reliant on a non-probabilistic
version of IBE.
4 The epistemic relevance of empirical confir-
mation
IBE-driven realism is forced to commit to the existence of dark matter despite
the fact that it has eluded empirical detection. Even though some realists could
bite the bullet and say that this is all in good order, the bullet might be a
canon ball. The reason why is that approaching selective confirmation via in-
dispensability has a direct impact on the relevance of empirical confirmation
by detection. In the context of dark matter, selective confirmation via indis-
pensability and the application of IBE generates a truth-statement about dark
matter, effectively implying that the possible empirical confirmation of dark
matter would contribute no justification to the belief that dark matter is real.8
8It also suggests that realists should recommend the abandonment of alternative research-
paradigms to dark matter. See Dellsén (2019) for arguments concerning scientific realism and
theoretical conservatism.
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Cosmologists and astronomers usually talk about the confirmation of dark mat-
ter as a Nobel prize worthy achievement, but I’m not convinced that the Nobel
committee will settle for confirmation by indispensability. The core of the prob-
lem is this: if we should already believe that dark matter is real and exists,
what possible epistemic addition to the rationale of this belief could empirical
confirmation make? Again, if IBE operated probabilistically, the evidence cou-
pled with the explanatory power and predictive success of dark matter would
impact the probability that the dark matter hypothesis is true, but not to the
level where empirical discovery would be made redundant. But as we have seen,
the realists discussed in this paper have argued against the compatibilist view.
What could such realists say against the charge that their view makes empirical
confirmation redundant?
4.1 Existential quantifier realism?
One way for the realist to attribute epistemic relevance to empirical confirmation
is to highlight the distinction between being realist with respect to the claim
that there is an entity to which dark matter refers, and being realist with respect
to the nature and properties of that entity:
[I]t is one thing to assert that there is an entity to which a term
t refers, quite another matter to find out the exact nature of this
entity, and hence to specify the correct description to associate with
the term t used to refer to this putative entity. (Psillos 1999, 283)
While there are some constraints imposed on the class of possible dark matter
particle candidates given by the astrophysical and cosmological evidence as well
as from unsuccessful direct detection experiments, there is still a large number
of different theoretical possibilities left, ranging from supersymmetric particles,
extra dimensions, weak neutrinos, hidden sector self-interacting dark matter,
and so on. Given the large class of dark matter candidates, the realist can
point to a very important and significant way in which empirical confirmation
by way of discovery can impact the epistemic status of dark matter - it tells
us about the nature and properties of dark matter. There is no reason to be
realist about anything more specific than the existential statement that there is
some x such that it causes the phenomena we observe. Embracing confirmation
via indispensability and IBE is sufficient for realism about the existential claim
about some object, while empirical confirmation is necessary for establishing
the nature of that object.
This partition of confirmation about the existence of dark matter and its
nature is a neat solution to the present challenge. Unfortunately, it suffers from
two problems: i) it requires a theory of reference which makes referential success
trivial, and, ii) it depends on the existence of a class of alternative theories about
the nature of dark matter.
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4.2 Referential success
One of the problems facing realism is how theoretical terms can be taken to
refer successfully in light of substantial theory change. The realist project is
founded on a connection between empirical success and truth, and since the
successful reference of theoretical terms to ontologically robust objects is a nat-
ural consequence of this connection, successful reference in theory change is
a vulnerable point in the realist framework. The argument against realism is
that there are theoretical terms in past theories which, despite being empiri-
cally successful, never referred to anything at all. Laudan (1981) has perhaps
most forcefully pushed this point against realists, arguing that past successful
theoretical terms such as “luminiferous aether” are now abandoned and con-
sidered non-referring.9 As a response to Laudan’s argument, realists adopted
a causal theory of reference that they thought could strengthen referential suc-
cess in cases where a term was successful but still abandoned.10 According to
causal models of reference, references are fixed existentially, usually by simple
ostension (Psillos 1999). Given that ostension is a poor way to fix references to
unobservable objects, we may substitute it for the assumption that the cause
of some observed phenomena is associated with, in Psillos’s terms, a ‘physical
magnitude’. Since we observe some phenomena with an unknown cause, we can
associate a physical magnitude to the cause with a term t. This is taken to be
the introduction of the term t which refers to the physical magnitude responsible
for causing the phenomena. We now have a causal theory of reference that seem
to fix the existential reference of the term ‘dark matter’ as being introduced to
explain the cause of galaxy cluster dynamics. This condition states that there
is a physical magnitude, an object or a structure, to which ‘dark matter’ refers.
The nature and properties of that physical magnitude, however, can remain un-
specified or be updated once theoretical or empirical work has been done. For
instance, in the early 1900’s, the use of ‘dark matter’ picked out a particular
class of objects:
[A]stronomers at the time [1930’s] were open to the possibility that
large amounts of dark matter might be present in astrophysical
systems, in the form of “extinguished stars, dark clouds, meteors,
comets, and so on”, as Lundmark writes in 1930. (Bertone and
Hooper 2018, 18)
It is clear that there is no overlap between what scientists in the early 20th
century thought dark matter to be, and what scientists today think that dark
matter is. On a purely causal account of reference, however, there is no tension
between the early and the later use of the term since they both satisfy the same
causal role played by it – exerting gravitational influence. The causal account,
however, makes successful reference too easy to get. The early use of ‘dark mat-
ter’ referred to low-luminous macroscopic objects made of ordinary (baryonic)
9See also Lyons (2006), Stanford (2003), and Elsamahi (2005).
10See Hardin and Rosenberg (1982) and Laudan (1984) for exchanges in this debate.
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matter and the modern use refers to non-luminous, microscopic non-baryonic
matter. Given that the two descriptions of dark matter share no salient content
with respect to the properties of the object, the continuing referential success
of ‘dark matter’ in terms of fixing the reference existentially is inconspicuous.
Laudan (1984) argues against the causal account of reference on precisely those
grounds – if reference is fixed purely as an existential claim that an object is
the cause of some phenomena, then the success of that reference is guaranteed
despite the fact that theoretical changes over time attribute radically different
properties to the object. Referential success then becomes a trivial matter be-
cause the causal theory of reference is tailor made to succeed. Further problems
with the causal theory of reference is that it separates what a scientist is talking
about from what she thinks she is talking about:
Aristotle or Newton could be said to be referring to geodesic mo-
tion in a curved spacetime when, respectively, they talked about the
natural motion of material objects, and the fall of a body under the
effect of the gravitational force. Ladyman (2020)
Ladyman’s argument in this context implies that it would mean that Zwicky,
Poincaré and others who used the term ‘dark matter’ in the first half of the
20th century were actually referring to non-baryonic non-luminous particles all
along, which is clearly false. A purely causal account of reference will simply
not do. Psillos, well aware of these issues, adds a descriptive component to his
theory of reference:
1. A term t refers to an entity x if and only if x satisfies the core causal
description associated with t.
2. Two terms t’ and t denote the same entity if and only if (a) their putative
referents play the same causal role with respect to a network of phenom-
ena; and (b) the core causal description of t’ takes up the kind-constitutive
properties of the core causal description associated with t. (Psillos 1999,
296)
The descriptive addition specifies that there must be some properties attributed
to the object such that it can play its stipulated causal role. But the kind-
constitutive properties associated with the core causal description of dark mat-
ter must necessarily be informed by theory, and therefore go beyond the mere
existential claim that dark matter exists. The existential claim is therefore cou-
pled with the purely causal theory of reference which, by realists own admission,
is insufficient to handle problems associated with theory change. Furthermore,
one may worry about how to assess the core causal description of dark matter
in the first place, and whether there is some overlap in the kind-constitutive
properties assigned to such descriptions between the theories about its nature
proposed in the early 20th century and the current propositions.
10
4.3 Dependence on alternatives
The realist solution that empirical confirmation finds a function in the context of
justification with respect to the nature of dark matter is only valid in situations
which contain formulated alternative theories. The solution cannot in principle
maintain the partition in order to keep IBE-driven realism from resulting in a
full fledged realism about the existence and nature of some objects in contexts
without empirical confirmation. This becomes apparent once one reflects on the
fact that it is contingent whether or not there are alternative theories to any
given theory. If there is only one formulated theory, the proposed existential
quantifier realism collapses into full blown realism. On a paradigm level, this is
essentially the case for dark matter. The only alternative theoretical paradigm
to dark matter is MOND, short for Modified Newtonian Dynamics, which has
failed many of the explanatory challenges that the dark matter paradigm has
succeeded to meet.11 Given that MOND is ruled out by explanationist IBE-
driven realism, only dark matter remains as a viable alternative, prompting a
realist commitment. Within the paradigm, however, things are not so clear. The
current situation with respect to dark matter does in fact contain a number of
proposed candidates, which, given a realist solution to the problem of reference,
should result in an innocuous realist commitment to the existence of dark matter
while still leaving an epistemic role for empirical confirmation to play regarding
the nature of dark matter. This situation, however, is contingent and is not
sufficient to withstand the principled issue. That is, the situation may change,
much like it has on a paradigm level, such that proposed dark matter candidates
are eliminated until only one remains. Suppose, for example, that all currently
formulated theories about the nature of dark matter except for, say Axions, are
ruled out. In such a situation, the moderate realism about the existence of dark
matter collapses into realism about the nature of dark matter. Not because
Axions have been experimentally or observationally determined to constitute
dark matter, but because of how IBE operates in that environment. Even
though this is a hypothetical scenario, there are reasons to think that this may
become a reality. The first reason is that many candidates for dark matter have
already been eliminated in the past, for example MACHOs (short for Massive
Compact Halo Objects) and any type of baryonic particle – that is, any type of
particle found in the standard model of particle physics. (Bertone and Hooper
2018) Another reason is the continuous failure of experimental physicists to
detect dark matter despite deploying a broad range of methods and techniques.
One may view this failure as support for the idea that dark matter may not be
detectable by any methods that experimental science can currently actualize.
In short, the space of alternatives is getting smaller and detection is not getting
closer. The situation should be enough to cause for concern for realists of the
11The explanatory challenges usually referred to is galaxy cluster dynamics, flat galaxy
rotation curves, the matter power spectrum, and gravitational lensing. See Bertone and
Hooper (2018) for a historical overview of the evidential history of dark matter and its relation
to MOND. See Merritt (2021) for a positive perspective of the explanatory merits of MOND
with respect to the above phenomena and realism.
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considered kind. The above reasoning shows that there is a principled tension
between empirical confirmation and IBE-driven realism that cannot be resolved
by reference to the current contingent factors of the situation.12
One could object against using a hypothetical scenario in which dark matter
candidates are ruled out by arguing that it is merely a fringe possibility.13 While
I gave some reasons to think that it is not just possible, but also likely, I will
give an additional reason to think that such situations constitute a cause for
concern by providing a brief analysis of a similar situation from the history of
atomism.
4.3.1 Isomers
At the turn of the last century, the scientific community was debating the epis-
temic credentials of the theory of scientific atomism.14 Critics of atomism ar-
gued, among other things, that the principled divide between the observable and
the unobservable rendered atomism a theory that could never be conclusively
confirmed, given that its core postulates were microphysical. Atomism, accord-
ing to this line of criticism, was a speculative theory with instrumental value at
best. Exponents of atomism claimed that its predictive success and explanatory
power should amount to significant epistemic support for the theory. One, for
our purposes, particularly interesting argument in favor of atomism comes from
late 19th century chemistry – the explanation of isomers.
Isomers are chemical compounds that consist of the same elements in equal
proportions but that nevertheless differ in their chemical properties. This pecu-
liar phenomenon in chemistry needed to be explained, and attempts at doing so
came from an atomist perspective. Both Le Bel (1874) and Van’t Hoff (1874)
theorized that if atoms were differently spaced in the molecular bonds in the
different isomers, this would explain the difference in chemical behavior. Inter-
estingly, the phenomenon of isomers appeared to be explained only by atomism:
First, in the absence of spatial positioning there seemed to be no de-
gree of freedom available at all to represent differences between sub-
stances that consisted of the same elements with same proportions.
Second, as had been observed by Louis Pasteur, different isomers of
salts of tartaric acid rotated the polarization axis of polarized light
in different ways. Given that light polarization was understood to
be a spatial phenomenon, it seemed difficult to imagine any physi-
cal representation of the effect of isomers on polarization that was
not based on spatial characteristics of the differences between the
isomers themselves. (Dawid 2020, 8)
12A realist solution to this problem could refer to the possible existence of unconceived alter-
natives, but that would mean revisiting the problem of unconceived alternatives by Stanford
(2003, 2006).
13Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for addressing this point.
14See Dawid (2020) for a full case analysis of the confirmational aspects of scientific atomism.
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Here there was only one theoretical option on the table, but the central ob-
jects of that option had not yet been empirically confirmed. For realists, the
situation would have merited full realist commitment without empirical confir-
mation, meaning that the later empirical detection of atoms by Perrin would
have contributed nothing to realism about atomism so long as no new properties
were discovered. The case of isomers shows that a context in which theoretical
alternatives are restricted to a single theory is a very live possibility in science.15
Presented with such situations, the realist epistemology will treat the indispens-
ability and explanatory virtues of a theory (or parts thereof) as sufficient for
conclusive confirmation of that theory with respect to the existence of its cen-
tral objects and their properties. It becomes clear, then, that the principled
tension between confirmation by indispensability and confirmation by empirical
detection is not merely a fringe possibility issue, but an real epistemic issue.
5 Probabilistic IBE
The core of my challenge is that IBE generates truth-statements in contexts
with insufficient empirical confirmation, thereby eliminating the epistemic force
of the detection or discovery of the central objects of a theory. While epistemic
optimism was one of the promises that IBE-driven realism aimed at delivering,
this epistemology is too optimistic. In the kind of situations I have described,
the fact that Psillos worried about - that Bayesianism does not have rules of
acceptance - is a good thing. It is not reasonable to accept a theory as true in
these contexts, and having an epistemology that forces you to do so is unwise.
The crux is that IBE is taken to deliver the (approximate) truth of a hypothesis
instead of a statement with respect to the probability of the hypothesis being
true. If explanatory considerations could instead act as grounds to increase
the probability of a hypothesis, the epistemic force of empirical confirmation by
detection would not be redundant. There are a number of ways that realists
could incorporate probabilistic reasoning in their IBE-driven framework. Lipton
(2003) provides a compatibilist model in which explanatory reasoning is central
to the heuristics of conditionalization. Weisberg has suggested that, due to
inconsistencies in the subjective compatibilist project, explanatory virtues ought
to constrain prior probabilities in a version of objective Bayesianism:
Forced to choose between IBE and subjective Bayesianism, I hope
that compatibilists will reject subjectivism and pursue a Bayesian
IBE with a more objectivist flavor. (Weisberg 2009, 2)
This means that two hypotheses, H1 and H2 are assigned different probabilities
depending on how well they perform with respect to some set of explanatory
virtues (or epistemic standards). The effect of this is that, once the Bayesian
machinery gets going, the posterior probability of the best explanation vis-à-vis
15There are other theories that are considered ”the only game in town”. Consider, for
example, the theory of evolution, the big bang theory, or string theory.
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the explanatory virtues is higher than its rival, given that P (E|H1) = P (E|H2).
Henderson (2013) argues that IBE can plausibly be thought to emerge from
Bayesian reasoning, thus offering a compatibilist view in which explanatory
considerations do not constrain priors, but are instead part and parcel of the
Bayesian machinery. There are options on the table for the realist: subjectivist,
objectivist, and emergent versions of compatibilism can all be explored in order
to deal with the present situation.
As we have seen, Psillos entertains the idea that a hypothesis can be accepted
as the most plausible one based on explanatory grounds where the degree of con-
fidence in the hypothesis is coupled with later empirical confirmation. However,
Psillos’s aversion against compatibilist approaches ultimately led him to aban-
don the idea of compatibilism altogether. Compatibilist approaches did not
attribute the level of epistemic significance to explanatory reasoning as desired,
either in the sense of explanatory power being washed out as a prior in subjec-
tivist accounts, or in the sense of merely operating in the context of discovery
in objectivist accounts. Is there any route to a probabilistic framework that
respects explanatory reasoning in the way Psillos claims it should? I want to
suggest a kind of probabilistic framework of confirmation that attributes epis-
temic relevance to explanatory considerations precisely in these kind of contexts
– that is, in cases in which there are no alternatives and non-probabilistic IBE-
driven realism collapses.
5.1 Meta-empirical theory confirmation
Even though dark matter has not been detected, most cosmologists and as-
tronomers display a high level of trust in the viability of the hypothesis that
there exist some form of non-luminous non-baryonic matter. A different, but
not completely dissimilar, situation can be found in the context of String the-
ory - string physicists have a high degree of trust in their theory despite the
(in)famous lack of empirical confirmation. In order to understand why, Dawid
(2013, 2015, 2016) developed an account of non-empirical theory assessment
that addresses precisely the situations that lack the data needed to evaluate a
theory empirically. In such situations, Dawid argues that we can nonetheless
assess the theory’s viability by analyzing its non-empirical features. In this
framework, there are three distinct ways that non-empirical facts can bear on
the confirmation of a theory: the no-alternatives argument, the argument of
unexpected explanatory interconnections, and the meta-inductive argument. I
follow Dawid and refer to the application of one or a combination of these as an
instance of meta-empirical confirmation (MEC). One reason for realists to take
interest in the framework is that a central feature of MEC is that it principally
respects the distinction between empirical and non-empirical confirmation:
[T]he distinction between MEC [Meta-Empirical Confirmation] and
empirical confirmation remains of crucial importance today because
it indicates a substantial difference in confirmation strength. Empir-
ical confirmation remains the only path to conclusive confirmation.
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(Dawid 2020, 15-16)
MEC is able to uphold this distinction precisely because it takes a probabilis-
tic approach to confirmation. Intuitively, explanatory considerations play an
important epistemic role in all three modes of MEC, making it attractive to
realists. As a proof of concept, I focus on the no-alternatives argument in con-
junction with the meta-inductive argument.
5.2 The no-alternatives argument
Scientists sometimes find themselves in contexts in which they have a theory
that can explain a range of phenomena but where that theory has not yet been
empirically confirmed. When such a situation is coupled with the fact that
the theory has no alternatives, the IBE-driven realist is forced to epistemically
commit to that theory, which makes empirical confirmation redundant. The
no-alternatives argument (NAA) offers a way to retain the idea that explana-
tory considerations have epistemic force without sacrificing the epistemic role of
empirical confirmation. The general idea of NAA is to limit underdetermination
by examining the explanations for the scarcity of theoretical alternatives:
Scientists have looked intensely and for a considerable time for alter-
natives to a known theory H that can solve a given scientific problem
but haven’t found any. This observation is taken as an indication of
the viability of theory H. (Dawid 2017, 17)16
There might be a number of explanations for why there are no formulated al-
ternatives – perhaps scientists are not clever enough; it might be a particularly
difficult problem; the computational resources might not yet be available, etc.
But the best explanation can be taken to be that there are, in fact, few alter-
natives. This explanation of the fact that there are no formulated alternatives
can be assessed probabilistically in the following way.17
Let Yk = {Y = k} be the expression that there are k number of alternatives
that satisfy the following conditions: fulfill a set of theoretical constraints C, ex-
plain existing data D, and give predictions for future experimental outcomes E .
If we assume that Y takes a value in the natural numbers, and that FA expresses
the fact that no alternative H ′ satisfying C, D, and E , has been found, then:
P (H|FA) > P (H). That is, FA confirms H. The degree to which FA confirms
H depends mainly on the number of alternatives. If the number of alternatives
is low, confirmation is stronger, if it is high, confirmation is weaker. The prior
assigned to the value of Yk can be determined by applying the meta-inductive
argument, providing reason to think that existing alternative explanations to
why scientists haven’t found an alternative theory are improbable:
16Even though Dawid uses MEC to evaluate the viability of a theory, realists can substitute
viability for truth without structural loss.
17For proofs and a thorough Bayesian analysis of the no-alternatives argument, see Dawid
et al. (2015).
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[I]f scientists have been so successful in finding viable theories in the
past, it seems less plausible to assert that they are not clever enough
for doing the same this time. (Dawid 2016, 14)
Again, the application of the meta-inductive argument serves to bolster the
explanation of theoretical scarcity to the fact that there are no alternatives.
Additionally, the three conditions C, D, and E are not so different from the
internal ranking-conditions of IBE:
Those hypotheses are ranked higher which a) explain all the facts
that led to the search for hypotheses; b) are licensed by the existing
background beliefs; c) are, as far as possible, simple; d) have unifying
power, e) are more testable, and especially, are such that entail novel
predictions. (Psillos 2000, 65)
One can see how MEC in a way echoes the explanatory virtues of IBE. In this
framework, they contribute to the confirmation of the theory, thereby operating
in the context of justification. In short, there is plenty of room in MEC for
explanatory considerations to make an epistemic difference in the context of
confirmation and justification, not just in the context of discovery, without
having to sacrifice the epistemic credentials of what is arguably the golden
standard of confirmation and justification in science - empirical confirmation.
Realist may of course remain skeptical of using MEC as a basis for a probabilistic
version of IBE given that it still lacks a well defined threshold for acceptance
of a theory as true, but given the situation presented above, providing such a
definition within the MEC framework would be less costly than to reject the
epistemic significance of empirical confirmation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that explanationist versions of selective scientific
realism in some cases imply realism about empirically unconfirmed objects and
that a consequence of this implication is the rejection of the epistemic signif-
icance of empirical confirmation. The realist, faced with this problem, should
turn to probabilistic frameworks for solutions. Given the realist aversion to
more classical compatibilist approaches to merge probabilistic reasoning and
explanatory reasoning, I suggest that they instead look to the theory of meta-
empirical confirmation. Tentatively, this theory can safeguard the epistemic
value of explanations while still avoiding the implication that empirical confir-
mation is redundant.
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